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 In a small town in Northern Nebraska, just south of the border with South Dakota, 
Elsie Eiler, mayor, bartender, and librarian, is now the only resident of a once growing 
town of more than a hundred. Eiler, who lived alone with her husband Rudy until his 
death in 2004, laments her lifelong friends’ choice to leave, but does not blame them. The 
lack of opportunity in rural communities like Monowi makes residency nearly 
impossible. Eiler’s stubborn ways kept her from leaving, but when she passes away, 
Monowi will go the way of so many other once bustling rural communities, and fall into 
disrepair, and that day is coming soon. 
 This is not an isolated incident: ghost towns and rapid depopulation has always 
played a role in human history and the development of civilization. However, as the 
industrial age draws a close, and the information age takes it’s place, this problem seems 
to have sped up considerably. No country has displayed the symptoms of rural flight 
quite as dramatically as Russia, however, where entire cities now lie derelict, revisited 
only by the government or by vagrants.  
 In order to get a handle on this problem, and why it’s happening, we must begin 
with a rudimentary understanding of the three great ages of modern civilization, the first 
of which began several thousand years ago. When humans first began to tame the natural 
world around them, and cultivate crops, the first great age, the Agricultural Age, began. 
Now, enough food could be grown that nomadic practices of hunting and gathering could 
halt, bringing together people in areas of commerce across the world.  
 The transition to agricultural styles of life from a foraging life, also known as the 
Neolithic Revolution, is unique from the other two great ages in that it was the first, 
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laying the foundation for the other two. Despite being over ten millennia ago, the 
Neolithic Revolution led to all sorts of developments still with us today, including the 
first written languages for accounting purposes,1 the earliest institutes of higher 
education, and the origins of the scientific method.2 
 With agriculture came the ability to develop larger communities, leading to the first 
towns, the first cities, and the first systems of government. However, the heavy reliance 
on food production meant these cities were limited in size by their ability to transport 
food effectively, and were thus relatively small. This age would persist for thousands of 
years, the methods of production and changing, but the focus of civilization remaining 
constant. The absolute necessity of food production meant that a massive portion of the 
population lived in rural areas, on farms. 
 Then, in the 19th century, the second great shift in civilization occurred, with the rise 
of the Industrial Age. The open, decentralized styles of government could now be better 
regulated. Just as the social change from forager to farmer allowed the most assertive and 
aggressive to take on the roles of emperor, king, or other sort of ruler, the social change 
from farmer to factory worker allowed the most assertive to seize power as Robber 
Barons, the people at the very top, who used every power at their disposal in the pursuit 
of more power and more wealth. This power allowed them to write laws protecting them 
and their monopolies only broadening their influence over the society. These were the 
caesars of the Industrial Age: anti-competition leaders who sought personal glory and 
                                                        
1 Barker, Graeme. The Agricultural Revolution in Prehistory: Why Did Foragers Become 
Farmers? Oxford: Oxforder U Press, 2009. Print. 
2 Neugebauer, O. The Exact Sciences in Antiquity. New York: Dover, 1969. Print. 
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managed to spread their authority not just over the means of production, but over 
industries, legislatures, and entire cities.  
 The Rockefeller family, headed by John D. Rockefeller, one such man of the time, 
would make by today’s standards the fortunes of Bill Gates and Warren Buffett seem 
insignificant by comparison. Conservative estimates by Forbes place John D. 
Rockefeller’s net worth today, adjusted for inflation, to be approximately $336 billion.3 
Similarly, the worth of Mansa Musa, 14th Century King of Mali, would make even 
Rockefeller’s great fortune appear inconsequential. Estimating the value of Musa is 
nearly impossible, but his dazzling reign was filled with such extravagance that on his 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the gold he spread would destabilize European economies for 
nearly a century. His exorbitant wealth was so brilliant, it was said to put even the 
African sun to shame. 
 We are now making a transition into the third great age of civilization, the 
Information Age. As the Industrial age draws to a close, and the factory workers find 
themselves independent, destabilized, with an increasing need for entrepreneurship, the 
archaic factory towns of the Industrial Age are becoming a relic of the past. Steel 
workers, assembly line workers, company men of every stripe are being driven out, and 
forming startups, pursuing their fortunes independently in the cities. The new cutting 
edge is no longer slow constant production of goods, but fast, agile, cheap business 
practices, with heavier prioritization on minimizing space and costs, rather than 
maximizing production. 
                                                        
3  Forbes, The All-Time Richest Americans, All the Money in the World. September 14th 
2007. Website. https://www.forbes.com/2007/09/14/richest-americans-alltime-
biz_cx_pw_as_0914ialltime_slide.html 
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 Russia has clearly and dramatically demonstrated each great change, and as Russia 
has evolved, so too have it’s people. Though borders change, and contemporary political 
and social forces redraw the map frequently, the Russian sense of identity that feels itself 
descended Rurik has remained the same for centuries.  
 The Russian empire, long organized by a system of absolutism, where the absolute 
executive power was concentrated with the Tsar, was practically a feudal state, relatively 
unchanged since it’s inception in 1721 all the way up until the end of the 19th century. 
Tsar Nicholas II showed himself to be a weak leader, allowing the aristocracy to brutally 
lord over the people, solely to protect his own autocracy. This led to a rural, poorly 
educated, agricultural society, far behind the rest of Europe and the United States in 
industrial development. 
 The Russian empire, like all regressive oligarchies, was woefully unsustainable, 
and provoked the fury of the peasant class. When it all came crashing down, the 
revolution that followed was one of the bloodiest revolts of all time, with the rich 
desperate to protect their power at all costs. Russians were slaughtered by the millions 
over the course of just a few decades. The transformation of Russia from an outdated 
agricultural power with the majority spread in rural villages across the country to an 
industrial power under the Soviet leadership. This massive shift necessitated the forced 
uprooting of millions of Russians, and considerably changed the course of Russian 
history. The village was to become a fragment of a bygone era, and the apartment would 
take it’s place as the domicile of the modern age. 
 The revolution, led by the poorly educated, established the Soviet Union, one of 
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humanity’s earliest experiments with Marxist-style communism. Part of this came a 
centralized command economy, instituted and maintained by the Soviet. This gave the 
government the power to move people to wherever it saw fit, “for the good of the state.” 
Under the Soviet Union’s watchful eye, people were moved from the small farms into the 
towns, where they could work in the industrial factories. The Second World War, forcing 
even greater amounts of people into areas around munitions and steel factories across the 
Soviet Union, exacerbated this shift. 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union was far less bloody than it’s commencement. 
With the disintegration of the Union came the fall of the command economy. No longer 
were people forced to live where the state told them to, and no longer were people 
guaranteed a job and food. The period immediately after the fall, what has come to be 
known in Russia as the ‘crazy 90s’ saw a mad dash to grab power before the government 
could stabilize. The most aggressive again rose to the top, and the criminal underworld 
thrived. Many felt their only chance for survival was in the most major cities.  
 Now, Russia is one of the least rural developed countries in the world, with the vast 
majority of all Russians living in the cities. The villages of Russia, former factory towns, 
and former farms, have fallen into disrepair, and despite the efforts of Putin and the 
ministers of Russia, the trend toward the cities looks irreversible. Incentivisation 
programs, such as President Putin’s homesteading efforts, have been lackluster at best, 
and have been met with an equal level of disinterest from the Russian populace.  
 As Russia evolved culturally, from feudal to Marxist and finally, to rudimentarily 
capitalist, the dwellings of it’s people have changed tremendously. In 1870, about 50 
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years before the revolution, the majority lived in multigenerational households in the 
villages across Russia. Without any alternative and seriously lacking the means to pursue 
any alternative, the vast majority lived in simple cottages and houses in villages across 
the empire. Then, when the revolution came, these people were forced out of these 
houses and into kommunalki, which were the first major prefabricated housing in Russia. 
The kommunalki were squat, simple apartments with communal kitchens and bathrooms, 
and would be built across the Union as the government forced people out of their cottages 
and into housing near the new factories. These apartments would evolve with successive 
leaders, first into Khrushchevki, then Brezhnevki, and finally after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, into the uniquely modern Russian prefabricated housing we see today.  
 With each shift in age came a great shift in where the people lived, and as Russians 
fled the rural areas, the style of housing evolved to accommodate them in their new 
homes.   
 10 
Part I 
 
The Feudal State 
1870-1917 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How the opulence of the aristocracy saw Russia lag behind the rest 
of the world in development 
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 During the late nineteenth century, the Russian government undertook several 
policies of rapid industrialization, which will be the focal point of my paper, as these few 
formative years would tangentially shape the lives of millions of Russians over the 
following century. The goal of industrialization, unlike in many of the other western 
powers, was not for the benefit of the society or the genuine improvement of the military, 
but to keep alive a façade of Russian strength.  
 Tsar Alexander II, a reformer, sought the counsel of Konstantin Pobedonostsev, 
advisor to the three tsars, internationally renowned statesman, and spokesman for 
reactionary and conservative positions.4 A reformer, Alexander II advocated for cautious 
military renewal and social restructuring, bringing Russia back into relevancy as a major 
power, with the counsel of Pobedonostsev to keep his self-admittedly often overly 
optimistic goals in check. Pobedonostsev was, in the mind of Alexander, the yin to 
Alexander’s hasty yang. Alexander’s social accomplishments were too many to list. For 
the sake of constraining this paper, I will focus on those policies that would directly set 
the stage for the revolution, and ultimately, the shift from rural to urban. During his reign, 
he completed a rebuilding of the judicial system, emancipation of the Russian serfs5, 
establishment of the zemstva6, and heavy promotion of education.7 
 In his attempts to reorganize the judiciary branch of Russian government, 
Alexander would move power from the aristocracy to the emerging middle class. To this 
                                                        
4 Mazour, Anatole G. Russia: Tsarist and Communist. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, 1966. Print.  
5 Lynch, Michael. The Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, 1861: A Charter of Freedom 
or an Act of Betrayal? N.p.: History Review, 2003. Print. 
6 Radzinsky, Ėdvard. Alexander II: the last great tsar. New York: Free Press, 2006. Print. 
p.148 
7 ibid p.152 
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end, he advocated democratic elections for local justice across his empire, 
compartmentalizing problems and removing the justice bottleneck from the realm. Where 
before, imprisonment might take several months or even years while local townships 
waited for the tsar to pass judgment, now could be sorted out quickly, and by elected 
leaders. This taste of freedom would eventually prove to be both a backlash against the 
autocratic rule of Alexander III and Nikolai II, and also set the stage for a Soviet 
empowering of the proletariat. The emancipated serfs could effectively elect judiciary 
representatives, facilitating Soviet mobilization of the workforce.  
 Alexander’s implementation of the Zemstvo system, a rudimentary form of local 
government, was Russia’s first unequivocal push toward personal accountability and self-
government. Many prior tsars had governed with an unshakeable authoritarian rule, the 
torrid history of which is framed by death squads, gratuitous killings, and near-genocides. 
The zemstvo clearly demonstrated a push toward liberal democracies, as its 
representatives encompassed every class of Russian citizen: aristocrat, minor landowner, 
townsman, lower class citizen, and peasant.8 Author Edvard Radzinsky describes the 
Zemstvo optimistically: “The very word zemstvo, from the word for land, zemlya, was 
imbued with liberty. Back in Muscovite Russia, important decisions were made by 
meetings of all estates, the Zemskoe Assembly, which were assemblies of all Russian 
landowners. It was appropriate to use the word for land in the name of local organs of 
self-government, because for the first time the entire land, the whole population, was 
involved. There were representatives of the nobility, the peasantry, and the urbanites in 
                                                        
8 Radzinsky, Ėdvard. Alexander II: the last great tsar. New York: Free Press, 2006. Print. 
p.149 
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the assemblies.”9  
 The zemstvo would be, ultimately, a precursor to the Soviet, a localized political 
organization that the Soviet Union would use to govern its citizens, which would enable 
the leaders of the revolution to focus on more important matters, and leave minor 
governmental functions to officials from each region. In many cases, the villages across 
Russia were disconnected from the workings of the imperial state, as they were simple 
farmers, barely literate, and living in cottages without running water or even solid floors. 
Alexander II had sought to change this, and reform both the education and housing of 
Russia, but without his pressure-releasing reforms, fury would continue to build, as two 
more autocrats would attempt to hold back the inevitable decline of absolutism. 
Alexander II had penned a proclamation to establish a consultation system, limiting his 
own power, and granting additional power to democratically elected officials. This would 
have been potentially the first constitution of Russia, and would have likely commenced a 
more peaceful transition from agricultural to industrial, following the example of the 
west. But the day before he could establish this as law, he would be assassinated by a 
radical socialist revolutionary, Nikolai Rysakov, who would bomb the emperor’s carriage 
as it passed. 
 The liberal ideals of Alexander II were dashed by his son, a deeply conservative 
ideologue who readily embraced the guidance of Pobedonostsev, leading to 
Pobedonostsev’s unofficial position as “éminence grise.” He would go on to become one 
of the most powerful men in the Russian empire, and unshackled from liberal opposition, 
would pen Alexander’s Manifesto of April 29th 1881, establishing an unshakeable 
                                                        
9 ibid. p. 149 
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autocracy in which the tsar held absolute power. Alexander III, acting on the advice of 
Pobedonostsev cancelled his father’s tentative constitution10, signaling his absolute power 
to the world. Whatever liberal beliefs dwelled in Alexander III died after the 
assassination of his father. This signaled to him that the socialist viewpoint, and liberal 
philosophies at large were dangerous and needed to be stamped out. His reaction to his 
father’s death at the hands of an assassin was volcanic, as he felt it was an insult to his 
father’s legacy, and he had martyred himself for an ungrateful Russian citizenry. This 
event would solidify the reactionary tone of the following thirteen years. Revolutionaries 
were exiled, educational reforms were walked back, and the press had two choices: 
capitulate or be censored. Liberal proposals were quickly dismissed by either 
Pobedonostsev or Alexander himself, and to many in Western Europe, his authoritarian 
rule signaled an unstable Russia, led by a woefully unqualified commander with absolute 
power. Queen Victoria commented on him “a sovereign whom I do not look upon as a 
gentleman.”11 
 Dissent was crushed and forced underground, and capitalism began to take root in 
Russia. This triggered a natural migration in many cases across Russia towards towns, 
which were experiencing a significant uptick in travel and opportunity. Alexander was 
called the Peasant’s Tsar and his simple bombastic speaking style12, larger than life size, 
and fierce patriotism made him very popular with the former peasant class, and he did not 
see fit to appease the aristocracy, wholeheartedly supporting the peasants in their 
                                                        
10 King, Greg. The Court of the Last Tsar: Pomp, Power, and Pageantry in the Reign of 
Nicholas II. Hoboken: Wiley Publishing, 2006. Print. p. 157 
11 Malsom, Scott Web. "The Home of the Last Tsar - Romanov and Russian 
History." Alexander III Time Machine. N.p., 2009. Web. 18 Jan. 2017. 
12 Mazour, Anatole G. Russia: Tsarist and Communist. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, 1966. Print. p. 303. 
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migrations to the towns and cities.  
 Historian Anatole Mazour describes Alexander’s brashness as follows13: 
 “The new tsar came in with a single goal –eradication of sedition and consolidation 
of autocracy recently jolted by the bombs of terrorists. In sedition he saw the cause of his 
father’s tragic death; in autocracy he had implicit faith as the one and only form of 
government there could be in a civilized society…Neither by temperament nor by 
training was Alexander III qualified to assume power, yet fate willed that he should reach 
the throne at a decisive turn in Russian history. Barely educated, his tutor, Constantine 
Pobedonostsev, nevertheless imbued his royal pupil with a profound sense of autocratic 
responsibility and pride to fulfill a divinely ordained mission as Sovereign of Russia.” 
 As a monarch, Alexander III was absolute. Mazour goes on to explain how 
Pobedonostsev’s guidance would shape Alexander’s unwavering faith in autocracy, and 
this would prove to be the downfall of his much weaker son. 
 As a result of aforementioned early migration, a precursor of what was to come, the 
first Russian imperial apartments began to be built, particularly in Saint Petersburg and 
Moscow. Because of the nature of Russia as an agricultural nation, these buildings were 
typically only available to the most wealthy, and stand out today because of their grand 
facades and unique, intricate architecture. 
                                                        
13 Ibid p. 305-306 
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 These magnificent apartments once housed Muscovite aristocrats, and when the 
revolution came, rather than being destroyed like many buildings, they were converted 
into apartments for the first Bolsheviks. The architecture was modeled after European 
styles, particularly French. The magnificent thick walls often combined neoclassical 
architecture with early eclecticism, culminating in fabulously intricate facades. Peter the 
Great’s Europhile ways led to a culture that praised renaissance architecture, and the 
intense patriotism that pervaded Russian society at the time led to a combined style 
unique to Russia. The Palladian style of architecture would remain the dominant form of 
the Russian Empire, right up until the revolution. While the opulent apartments convey 
vast wealth, this contrasted with the neglected villages across Russia, where the majority 
of Russians lived barely better than those a hundred or two hundred years before.  
 18 
 Alexander III, like his father, died prematurely, but he had no heir whose rule 
would be appropriate, as Nikolai II was sickly and young14, utterly incapable of filling his 
father’s shoes. Though history view Alexander as a tyrannical despot, we cannot know 
the events that could have been. His premature death would ultimately bring Russia to the 
brink of annihilation just a few short years later. His cancellation of the constitution and 
heavy emphasis on autocracy led, in the short term, to both a boost in the Russian 
economy, and, paradoxically, made him very popular with the peasant class. But, in the 
long term, his refusal to adopt a Russian constitution left his weak son with much more 
responsibility than he was capable of handling, and his denial of the emerging realities of 
the world in terms of industrial development would cripple Russia. His views belonged in 
the past, and as the rest of the world adopted more liberal, industrial, urban lifestyles, 
Russia’s largely illiterate, uneducated populace was subjected to autocratic rule. When 
Alexander should have followed his father’s lead in advancing education, infrastructural 
development, and personal freedom, he chose to grant himself even more power, and 
surrounded himself not with a team of rivals, but an army of like-minded aristocrats.  
 From Alexander, we come to the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II. History typically 
views Nicholas II unfavorably, as an emperor who totally lost the respect of his subjects 
through his systematic suppression of his adversaries, and blood-spattered campaigns 
against Jews, Marxists, and other workers strikes. The scholar Arkadiy Sack describes 
him in 1918 cordially, but focuses more harshly on Pobedonostsev: “Nicholas II, the son 
of Alexander III, the last of the Romanoffs, overthrown by the Revolution of March, 
1917, had been brought up in an atmosphere vitiated by the soullessness and 
                                                        
14 Oldenburg, S. S., and Patrick J. Rollins. Last Tsar: Nicholas II, his Reign and his 
Russia. Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1977. Print. p. 19 
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obscurantism of Pobiedonostzev.”15 Although Nicholas’ weakness did eventually lead to 
the collapse of the Russian empire, he cannot be entirely blamed. His father had 
consolidated so much power to the autocrat, and though he was able to carry the mantle, 
Nicholas simply was not able to, and Sack’s criticism of Pobedonostsev is more 
judgmental than analytical, it is not without precedent: Pobedonostsev’s counsel of 
Alexander III was the reason the autocrat held so much power. His scathing description 
of Pobodonostsev continues, as he illustrates what would naturally follow: “It was very 
evident that Pobiedonostzev was to be permitted to continue his reign of darkness.  The 
revolutionists, who had been completely disheartened, saw now the opportunity to revive 
their movement.”16 Had it not been for the assassination of Alexander II before his 
constitution was ratified, it is likely that the Russian change from agricultural to industrial 
would have been considerably less bloody.  
 One of the first actions Nicholas II took, as tsar was the complete rejection of a 
cabal of zemstva visited the winter palace to propose court reforms and a constitution, as 
a means of granting more power to the regional governments, a decision severely 
condemned by Sack and Mazour. Part of these reforms included mandatory education for 
all subjects of the Russian Empire, something that was direly lacking across the land. But 
Nicholas II rejected these, following his father’s example of absolute autocrat. “It has 
come to my knowledge that during the last months there have been heard in some 
assemblies of the zemstva the voices of those who have indulged in a senseless dream 
that the zemstva be called upon to participate in the government of the country. I want 
                                                        
15Sack, Arkady J. The Birth of the Russian Democracy. New York: Russian Information 
Bureau, 1918. Print. p. 75 
16 ibid. p. 75 
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everyone to know that I will devote all my strength to maintain, for the good of the whole 
nation, the principle of absolute autocracy, as firmly and as strongly as did my late 
lamented father.”17 
 Though this rejection made him unpopular, it was just the first of many refusals to 
adapt to a changing liberal world, one in which autocracy had no place. After issuing a 
reformation proclamation, in which he promised little concrete reforms, protestors 
attempted to march on the Winter Palace, but this rebellion was brutally crushed by the 
tsar. This was to be a critical turning point in the favorability of Nicholas II, as his 
perceived callousness in handling the grievances of the working class severely damaged 
him in their eyes, many of whom felt a paternal link to the royal family. A prominent 
leader of the March, George Gapon, wrote a public letter to the Tsar,  
 «Разобьём Вдребезги правительственныи насос самодержавия – насос, что 
кровь нашу из жил тянет, выкачивает, поит, вскармливает лиходеев наших 
досыта... И да падёт вся кровь, имеющая пролиться – на голову палача-царя да на 
голову его присных!»18 
 «…Break into pieces the pump of autocracy, pumping our blood drawn from the 
veins, pumping it and feeding our enemies... Let all the blood be poured on the head of 
our tsar the executioner, and on the heads of his compatriots.» 
 Gapon went on to call on the socialists and workers to unite against the autocratic 
                                                        
17  Radziwill, Catherine (1931) Nicholas II, The Last of the Tsars, London: Cassell and 
Company Ltd., p. 100. Text. 
18 Gapon, George “Воззвание ко всему крестьянскому люду» Издание Партии . 
Социалистов-Революционеров. St. Petersburg. 1905. Print. 
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rule of the tsar, further kindling the embers of disloyalty, and calling into question for the 
first time since Alexander II whether autocracy and tsarism were viable styles of 
government. German historian Werner Mosse chronicles letters between imperial figures 
and family members showing a lack of faith in the tsar’s capabilities.19 After the 
rebellion, Russia's finance minister Sergei Witte began urgently stressing the need for 
constitutional reform, and democratic interventionism in revolutionary hotbeds across the 
country. Though loyalty to the tsar still was the dominant undercurrent among laborers, 
Witte sensed a growing resentment that could only be appeased by a relinquishment of 
autocratic power. Nicholas, however, was hurt by the suggestion and took the autumn off 
ruling to go hunting, leaving the country in the hands of his advisors. During this time, 
Russia would lose Russo-Japanese war, severely damaging the already rapidly dwindling 
respect for the royal family. As strikes and mutinies gripped the country, Nicholas was 
forced to yield to Witte's judgment, agreeing to make steps away from autocracy, 
establishing the Imperial Duma.20  
 Though this new democratically elected advisory function was granted legislative 
power, Nicholas remained a steadfast proponent of autocracy. The first Duma, on their 
very first day, demanded universal suffrage, land reform, the pardoning of political 
prisoners, and more democratically elected representatives.21 Professor John Westwood 
describes the tenor of these unilateral demands as “world-weary and unwavering,” as 
though these reforms had been long overdue. Unsurprisingly, Nicholas reacted furiously, 
                                                        
19 Mosse, Werner E. Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia. London: English 
Universities Press ltd., 1958. Print. 
20Ferro, Marc, and Brian Pearce. Nicholas II: Last of the Tsars. New York: Oxford U 
Press, 1994. Print. p. 83 
21 Westwood, John N. Endurance and Endeavour: Russian history 1812-1992. Oxford: 
Oxford U Press, 1995. Print. p. 68 
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dissolving the Duma, and only further radicalizing the members of the second Duma, 
who would convene a year later. While the Social Democrats and revolutionaries did not 
participate in the first duma, they had won considerable support since then, and took 
nearly a third of the seats in the second Duma. Sack emphasizes this point, as it highlights 
the uphill battle the government found itself in by dissolving the first Duma: “Of the 520 
members the government had to face now a far stronger opposition than in the First 
Duma. One of the reasons for the impressive consolidation of the opposing forces was 
that this time the socialists entered the elections, whereas formerly they had boycotted the 
Duma altogether. Consequently, 180 Socialists entered the lower chamber, ready to 
exchange blows with the government. This was something the government had not 
expected, and instant deadlock between the opposition and the government resulted.”22 
 Nicholas and his advisors, most notably the new Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin 
tried frantically to cultivate the same bond between tsar and peasant, to take power back 
from the socialists, but it was to no avail.23 Stolypin’s reformist tendencies granted the 
peasantry the loans they needed to buy land_ and make something more of themselves, 
and his tenure as prime minister was marked by his increasingly desperate attempts to 
hold back revolutionary groups by appeasement and passing legitimate agrarian reforms. 
By creating a class of landowners, he hoped to both introduce a dependency on the 
market and improve the daily lives of the peasant class. Stolypin’s reforms would yield 
productive results, greatly increasing Russian crop production, and injecting much 
foreign capital into the Russian economy from grain exports. 
                                                        
22 Sack, Arkady J. The Birth of the Russian Democracy. New York: Russian Information 
Bureau, 1918. Print. p. 385 
23  Massie, Robert K. Nicholas and Alexandra. Michigan: Ballatine , 2013. Print. p. 65 
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 Stolypin would, however, be assassinated by a student and reactionary sympathizer, 
an act that cemented in the minds of the populace the tsar’s unwillingness to relinquish 
power, despite his avowed respect and support for Stolypin. 
 Without Stolypin’s sage advice, Nicholas fell back on his old hesitant ways, deaf to 
the growing storm, and refusing once again to grant the Duma legislative authority. 
Arguably, the final straw for many was his perceived dragging of Russia into the First 
World War. Though Russia had always relied on superior numbers, rather than superior 
technology, the war highlighted for the world the total decay of the Russian military. 
Russia had nearly 2 million troops ready for combat with another 3 million waiting in 
reserves. However despite these superior numbers, the government’s contempt for heavy 
industry was now fully on display, with pitiful munitions, almost no heavy artillery, and 
even lacking in wartime essentials such as boots and coats. Bolsheviks remembering 
these times would eventually make industrialization a primary priority. 
 Throughout the war, the Russian government failed to produce any supplies, 
creating national rebellions. A famine gripped the nation, as many farmers were 
conscripted into Russia’s vast armies, and food prices understandably soared. 
Simultaneously, sever weather conditions irreparably damaged the Russian railway 
systems, delivering direly needed emergency shipments of coal and food. The first 
outright riot began in Petrograd on February 23rd 1917, as the people began to break 
shop windows, loot aristocrat houses, bring out red banners, and began chanting “down 
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with the tsar!”24 
 The tsar, and his minister of the interior Alexander Protopopov, ordered that the 
rioters be detained, and the demonstrations be halted. However, as most of the police and 
regular army had gone to fight, the Petrograd garrison was woefully ill equipped to 
handle the riots.25 
 
 Historian J.C. Trewin and Charles Gibbes, a tutor of Nicholas II who shared 
imprisonment with the Imperial family, have painstakingly chronicled through journal 
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entries and photographs the overrunning of the Petrograd police garrison, and the 
panicked letters that ensued. Many of these makeshift policemen did not even have rifles 
or uniforms. Above is a photograph of the entire Tobolsk guard, redirected to attempt to 
stem the tide of revolution at Petrograd.26 General Khabalov, on the eleventh of March, 
ordered the police to fire into the crowds of people, killing over 200. Nicholas ordered 
reinforcements to Petrograd and suspended the Duma, but as if characteristic of almost all 
his actions up to this point, it was too little too late.  
 One by one, the regiments mutinied, and by the end of the next day, nearly 100,000 
soldiers had joined the revolution.27 The provisional government demanded Nicholas 
abdicate the throne, and with no options left to him, and his family taken hostage, 
Nicholas stepped down, ending three centuries of Romanov rule, and violently forcing 
the change that Nicholas had put off for so long. When the revolution inevitably came to 
Tobolsk (as seen below28) there were simply no police to restrain them as they marched 
on the governors house. 
 Nicholas and his family were caught while trying to flee, imprisoned, quickly tried, 
and summarily executed in the house where they were caught, bringing to an end the rule 
of the Romanovs in Russia after centuries. Nicholas was unavailable as a leader, and 
refused to make concessions, something that simply was an unfeasible position in the 
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cold light of the 20th century. By disregarding his advisors wishes that he relinquish 
power, work with the Dumas, or even turn rule over to the advisors themselves, Nicholas 
damned not only himself, but also his country to the unimaginable horrors that would 
follow. 
   
 Although what happened to Nicholas and his family is tragic, and he was canonized 
in Russian Orthodox Church for facing death with bravery, we must also examine the 
potential he had for reform. During the war, his efforts were completely directed on 
victory over Germany and Austro-Hungary, but even when his supply lines dwindled, he 
still did not consider industrialization, nor did he make any wholehearted attempts before 
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the war to shift the majority of his subjects away from agricultural lifestyles. If a modern 
historian could speak directly with Nicholas, it is likely Nicholas’ hesitance to act in a 
truly reformist manner would have been due to Russia’s immeasurable vastness. This 
theory was furthered by reporter Thomas Maugh, whose research into the tsar’s family 
led him to conclude Despite the zemstva, and local governments, enacting change from 
the top down simply was not feasible because of the disconnectedness and fragility of the 
Russian Empire. Though the aristocrats lived in architecturally complex palaces in 
Russia’s cities, the vast majority of Russians had to consign themselves to regressive 
existences, living in squalid abodes in the villages across the empire.
 
 This pre-revolution photo29 demonstrates the simple realities of life for a Russian 
peasant living just outside Tobolsk. The houses were made out of the timber that 
                                                        
29 Trewin, J. C., and Charles Sydney Gibbes. The House of Special Purpose: an Intimate 
Portrait of the Last Days of the Russian Imperial Family. New York: Stein and Day, 
1982. Print. p. 149 
 28 
surrounded them, and thatched with the straw that grew in their farms nearby. The 
agricultural lifestyle by which they lived was apparent in every way of their being. 
 After the downfall of the Tsar, the revolutionaries would bring change across the 
country, and to do this, they needed to change the very ways that news of this change was 
delivered.30 Lenin, often credited as the father of the revolution, would become one of the 
first advocates for the Bolsheviks secret weapon in industrializing Russia: radio.   
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Part II 
 
The Revolution 
1917-1919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How radical change to the status quo would set the stage for an 
irrevocable shift in the general populace away from rural farms 
to factory towns 
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 Nearing the end of World War I, the Russian population overthrew the 
autocratic rule that had governed them for many centuries and established the 
world’s first Marxist-communist state. The Russian revolution spread across 
Imperial Russia like a plague, aided by the instability of the Russian government and 
the deep displeasure of the population. It took very little effort for the 
revolutionaries to remove the tsar from power, and as the Imperial government fell 
into shadow, the Bolshevik party emerged above the maelstrom, seizing power in 
the now-famous October Revolution. The Bolsheviks were able to manipulate affairs 
during the revolution, and as the revolution fizzled out, wrest complete control from 
rival factions, and as the formerly brittle Russian Empire gave way to the harsh 
industrial Soviet Union, great changes to the existing style of life accompanied it. 
 Despite being a massive world power, late Imperial Russia was notoriously 
unstable, marked by squabbling aristocrats and increasingly hostile peasantry, 
industrial workers, and progressives, whose anger was exacerbated by the 
government’s unwillingness to consider any form of social change. Russia was an 
exceptionally rural country, even into the twentieth century, in stark contrast to 
other European powers, which had been swept up by the Industrial revolution 
nearly a half century earlier. The peasantry was widespread across the country, and 
although serfdom was abolished in 1860, they felt cheated out of the land they had 
worked for generations. This political powder-keg just needed someone to light the 
fuse of resentment, and Vladimir Lenin, one of the leaders of the Bolshevik party, 
had just the idea for unification and direction of the peasants’ ire. As one of the 
earliest proponents of radio and mass-produced printed news as means to connect 
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the citizenry of Russia to the mouthpieces of the revolution, Lenin was able to 
manipulate the general populace through demagoguery and appealing to 
increasingly populist sentiments. In a letter to the Star, Pyotr Durnovo had this to 
say: “An especially favorable soil for social upheavals is found in Russia, where the 
masses undoubtedly profess, unconsciously, the principles of Socialism. In spite of 
the spirit of antagonism to the Government in Russian society, as unconscious as the 
Socialism of the broad masses of the people, a political revolution is not possible in 
Russia, and any revolutionary movement inevitably must degenerate into a Socialist 
movement.”31 “By broadcasting himself as the figurehead of the revolution, Lenin 
positioned himself to be the face of the Bolshevik party, and directed his 
increasingly loyal followers as chess pieces. The critical technological development 
of radio would also later spur the industrial revolution in first great migration in 
Russian history: the shift from rural, agricultural farms across the expanses of 
Russia, to the new industrialized towns of the Soviet Union. In fact, in the days 
before the Soviet government had the means to forcibly move people around the 
country, the singular development of radio and early Soviet media would prove the 
most critical of all new devices of incentivization.32 
 Richard Pipes chronicles the accusations of the descent into propaganda of the 
Soviet organization Comintern, a group that advocated world communism through 
media outreach: “According to Zinoviev, during its first year his organization was no 
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more than a propaganda association” But this statement cannot be taken at face 
value because a great deal of Comintern activity was clandestine. It happens to be 
known, for instance, that the head of the Soviet Red Cross Mission in Vienna gave 
local Communists 200,000 crowns with which to found their organ, Weckruf.”33 
 Although the radio served its purpose as an effective communication tool of 
the Russian Imperial government, it did not spread to the mostly feudal citizenry of 
Russia. Lenin, however, was an early advocate of radio for citizens, believing it to be 
an integral tool of control over the masses. While the American government poured 
funding into research for the purpose of military superiority, the Soviet plan called 
for funding for radio for the purpose of domestic use. However, because it was not 
based in audio in Russia yet, the radio still had to be transcribed and then read to 
the mostly illiterate class of peasantry, particularly in the more rural areas. The 
difference in the reasoning behind funding radio would speak to the difference 
between the ideologies of Russia and America. Lenin openly criticized the entire 
idea of war, saying that if world communism could be achieved, war would cease to 
be a concern. “We say: our aim is to achieve a socialist system of society, which, by 
eliminating the division of mankind into classes, by eliminating all exploitation of 
man by man and nation by nation, will inevitably eliminate the very possibility of 
war.”34 
 Though Lenin did not live to see the first radio broadcast in his new state, his 
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advocacy for it would prove one of the first steps in industrializing an agricultural 
nation. The first radio station opened by the revolutionaries in the Soviet Union was 
given very strong support from the new Soviet government.. It’s first broadcast was 
on November 23rd 1924 by Comintern. The Comintern radio station began to 
broadcast daily news reports in a new format, called “Oral Newspaper.” Because 
audible radio had not yet been brought to Russia, a typical audience would be a 
large crowd of Moscow citizens gathered around a podium in squares. “Появление 
Термина «громкоговоритель» было связано с таким именно характером 
вещания, с особы, стилем чтения материалов по радио, обращенного к 
множеству людей, собравшихся в одной месте («Рупор усиливающий телефон 
и говорящий толпе»)».35 It would not be for around ten more years that Russian 
citizens began to have vocal radios in their own homes. 
 In Britain and the U.S, the literacy rate among working class people rose 
sharply in the late 1800s, allowing newspapers to become one of the most profitable 
forms of media. This sudden change in the size and general class of the audience 
also changed the format of the newspaper. Because it was originally made for just 
the upper crust, news tended to focus more on gossip and foreign affairs, but as the 
target audience shifted, the writing style and nature of the stories shifted as well.  
 Unfortunately, this trend did not arrive to the common Russian citizens in time 
for the revolution. Newspapers by and large never truly took root in Russia in the 
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19th century, because with only a literate upper class, the profitability was very low. 
However, the revolutionaries realized that printed media was a very efficient means 
of control over ideas, and control over ideas gave them control over the daily life of 
Russians. Lenin himself said “A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and 
a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser.”36 
 The first newspaper that was designed for and paid for by revolutionaries was 
Pravda, founded on May 5th, 1912, which advocated communism and far left before 
the revolution actually broke out in earnest. The newspaper began before the 
October Revolution, but it is still operating today, from the same office on Pravda 
Street in Moscow. After the revolution, Pravda was acquired by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union37, as a political mouthpiece. 
Pipes shares on ominous description of the consolidation of Pravda by the 
government, and subsequent defamation of Trotsky, a father of the revolution. 
“Kamenev and Zinoviev wanted Trotsky expelled from the Party, but Stalin thought 
this not prudent: on his urging, the motion was rejected. The Politburo published in 
Pravda a resolution stating that notwithstanding Trotsky’s improper behavior, it 
was inconceivable to carry on work without him: his continued collaboration in the 
highest party organs was absolutely indispensible. Realizing that the regime of the 
‘troika’ was coming under increasing criticism, Stalin thought it advisable to pretend 
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that he wished to retain Trotsky as a valued if errant associate.”38  The acquisition of 
Pravda led to a dramatic change in the writing style as what was once a freely 
critical newspaper became much more about government support and advocacy. 
Each story was carefully crafted by a team of clandestine officials to deliver most 
efficiently the message of the state. By controlling the hearts and minds of a people, 
Stalin understood it would be much easier to manipulate poorly educated, largely 
illiterate people to give up their farms and cottages by promising them a worthy 
ideological goal. With this came the seeds of the first great migration. 
 The architects of the former Russian Empire who chose to remain in the 
country were pressured to denounce their old Classical styles, and began to 
endeavor in formalism, a futuristic and simple style, free of the older complexities of 
the palaces. The residents of the city apartments were evicted, and replaced by new 
tenants. As the Soviets had little time to achieve their great dreams of 
industrialization, everything was done as quickly as possible. In each communal 
apartment, a family was granted one room, while bathroom and kitchen were 
shared amongst the families. The interiors were quite simple, as the focus was on 
function rather than anything else. 
 These new media developments both facilitated and initiated the transition 
from agricultural to industrial and as the Soviet mass-media propaganda machine 
began in earnest, it would lay the groundwork for a mass migration to factories. 
Although the industrial working class had technically already come to Russia, 
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factory workers were clustered nearly exclusively in Moscow and Petrograd. Being 
such an agricultural society, urban overcrowding was not a problem ever before 
encountered by the Russian government, and frequent rotations of power coupled 
with a rapidly changing political paradigm meant that the Russians were wholly 
unprepared to make such a dramatic shift. With so few Russians receiving any form 
of higher education prior to the revolution, enabling mass media was one of the 
earliest motivational tools employed by the Bolsheviks in the pursuit of an 
industrialized Russia. The shift away from media of old and ready embracing of the 
new enabled the great changes the later Soviet government would seek to enact.  
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Part III 
 
The Monolith Rises 
1920-1945 
 
 
 
 
How the Soviet Union forced a quick, but unsustainable growth 
of industrial power and sanctioned the dragging of it’s citizens 
into factories 
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 After the Soviet Union had established itself as the new stable power in Russia, 
Joseph Stalin, a former protégé of Lenin, was able to secure power after Lenin’s 
death in 1924, and confirm himself General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party. Stalin was born in modern day Georgia, then the Tiflis 
Governorate of the Russian Empire. His bloody reign would be marked with a 
pyrrhic victory over the Nazi Empire, pogroms against the Jews, and the purges in 
which he would exile millions of his countrymen to work camps in Siberia. Stalin 
feared that the economies of the great western powers would soon advance too far 
ahead of Russia, and they would forfeit their delicate advantage. In a speech on to 
the Fourth Plenum of Industrial Managers in 1931, Stalin stated, “We are 100 years 
behind the advanced countries. WE must make good this lag in ten years. Either we 
do it, or they crush us!”39 boldly setting the precedent that would guide economic 
planning for the Soviet Union. 
 Stalin began, as early as 1928, setting up his first five year plan, using the State 
Planning Commission set up by Lenin in 1921.40 His plan involved seemingly 
impossibly optimistic targets for production across all industries, and a revamping 
of housing, power, and transport. Workers were encouraged by radio and other 
propaganda techniques to meet their individual targets, and those who could not 
would face punishments. By changing the behavior of the workers, the Soviets 
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aimed to wipe away the working practices of the formerly agricultural peasants, 
used to working at their own speed, and without a clock, and converted them, 
through propaganda, punishment, and rewards, into factory-workers. Absenteeism 
and even tardiness were strictly forbidden, and workers who took time off would 
likely face termination or worse. Though other countries had had the time to slowly 
phase out the agricultural practices and lifestyles and phase in the newer, fast-paced 
lifestyle, the Soviet Union would attempt to make this shift in a few short months.  
 Early in the Soviet Union, the rewards for meeting the goals set in the five year 
plan would be vast, including higher salaries, more lenience, and even coveted extra 
days off from work. However, it became apparent early (around 1932)41 that this 
would not be enough to convince people to work beyond their capabilities. As 
workers began leaving the new factory towns to attempt to find some other work 
more in keeping with their old lives, the Soviet government introduced something 
that would render the shift from farm to town permanent: internal passports.  
 Although Imperial Russia had a similar system of internal passport, this was 
done with the explicit goal of preventing laborers from around the empire leaving 
their rural areas and coming to the cities to cause trouble for the regime. However, 
in 1932, the new Soviet government found itself facing the opposite problem: people 
leaving the towns to try to return to a rural lifestyle. It’s declared purpose was the 
improve the registration of population and flush out hiding kulaks and enemies of 
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the state. Although it would not be finalized until the mid 1970s, the system began 
by documenting workers living near the newly built factories. Now, in order to move 
about the country, one needed to apply with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.42 
 The internal passport was not a new idea, nor was it a uniquely Russian 
concept, but it was indispensable to the regime more so than in any other place. 
Because of the shock of transitioning from agricultural to industrial so quickly, it 
was understandable that the new laborers would attempt to leave. Those who, just 
fifteen years prior were farmers operating at their own pace, found themselves 
confined to the clock and assembly line of the factory.  
 Another policy implemented by the early Soviet Union in pursuit of a 
completely industrialized landscape was the labor camp replacing the detainment 
facility.43 Stalin’s former allies Zinoviev and Kamenev were subjected to a show-trial 
and summarily executed. This would be the start of the great purge.  Opponents of 
the Stalinist regime, which included millions of peasants who opposed 
collectivization, poets, authors, doctors, any of the higher educated, Kulaks, and 
anyone who simply opposed a governmental policy. The propaganda stated that 
these people stood in the way of the proletariat through their hysterical naysaying, 
and they would be reeducated through useful employment but the truth was far 
more sinister. These people, by the millions, were conscripted into slavery, building 
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Russian roads, railways, bridges, canals, factories, and apartments. Anything that 
was ordered by the Soviet was to be constructed at the expense of the labor forces. 
Forced by the point of bayonet to tear down any semblance of old Russia and 
replace it with a modern Soviet-approved version. His paranoia meant that no one 
was safe: even closest advisors and lifelong friends often faced execution or exile. 
Later in life, on reflection, Stalin “…admitted to ‘grave mistakes… more mistakes 
than might have been expected…. Nevertheless the Purge of 1933-36 was 
unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial.’”44 
 These camps were supervised by Soviet secret police, and to this day, 
documents about the gulag are shrouded in secrecy, and it is likely that many of the 
horrors committed will never by brought to light. Personal accounts have been 
recorded, most notably by the Soviet dissident Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. In his book 
The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn demonstrates that he is critically aware of the 
problems with the obsession of robust ideological purity:  
 “Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience evildoing 
on a scale calculated in the millions. This cannot be denied, nor passed over, nor 
suppressed. How, then, do we dare insist that evildoers do not exist? And who was it 
that destroyed these millions? Without evildoers there would have been no 
archipelago.   
 There was a rumor going the rounds between 1918 and 1920 that the 
Petrograd Cheka, headed by Uritsky, and the Odessa Cheka, headed by Deich, did not 
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shoot all those condemned to death but fed some of them live to the animals in the 
city zoos. I do not know whether this is truth, or, if there were such cases, how many 
were there. But I wouldn’t set out to look for proof either. Following the practice of 
the blue caps, I would propose that they prove to us that this was impossible. How 
else could they get food for the zoos in those famine years? Take it away from the 
working class? Those enemies were going to die anyway, so why couldn’t their 
deaths support the zoo economy of the Republic, and thereby assist our march into 
the future? Wasn’t it expedient?  
 That is the precise line the Shakespearean evildoer could not cross. But the 
evildoer with ideology does cross it, and his eyes remain dry and clear.”45 
 Solzhenitsyn sees the clear danger presented by the propagandizing of the 
government, as it enables the most reprehensible behaviors of humanity to be not 
only sanctioned, but encouraged if politically beneficial. However, it seems that he 
does not hate his Soviet captors, as he simultaneously understands the necessity. 
Without the gulags, and the enslavement of millions, the country simply could not 
have feasibly materialized as quickly as it did, and their ideological pursuit of the 
“Worker’s Paradise” blinded those in power to the atrocities they were committing. 
The constant postponing of the industrial economy by Tsar Alexander III and his son 
were now forcing the Soviet government to make up for lost time. Stalin’s rule, 
though incredibly brutal, would see many great changes enacted. 
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 Gulags were necessary to force a modernization but at a cost that the citizens 
of the Soviet Union would pay for dearly. Working millions for long hours, little food, 
and no pay, with minimal protection from the elements was certainly a cheap way to 
rebuild the country quickly, and gather resources to fuel the new economy, and 
when one is so ideologically blinded by visions of paradise, one has no qualms about 
working people by the millions to their early deaths. In 1928, approximately 
7,000,000 workers went to the camps, and before the end of the year, more than a 
third of them would die. During the Stalinist purges, this number would climb to 
around 12 million46, many innocent47 by our standards, buried in unmarked graves, 
out in the permafrost of Siberia. 
 Despite the cost, the effects on the Soviet Union were dramatic. It became, in 
just ten years, the second largest industrial power in the world, a herculean effort. 
New steel plants, hydroelectric dams, railways, and massive grey apartment 
buildings appeared across the landscape. Factories were established, and around 
them grew towns full of laborers. A concrete example of this theory exists in the 
town of Magnitogorsk. Stalin modeled the town after the one-industry steel towns of 
the United States, Pittsburgh Pennsylvania and Gary Indiana. Magnitogorsk was a 
focal point in tours of the prosperity of the Soviet Union. In just four years (1928-
1932), it had gone from a rural, disconnected village to a massive titan of industry, 
with workers numbering more than half a million. 
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 Stalin’s ascent also heralded the beginning of another shift in Russian 
architectural styles, particularly during the war. Monumentalism took root as a 
boastful way to demonstrate to the world that Russia was not the backwards 
country of the past, but a shining example of modernism.
 
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of Stalin’s seven great skyscrapers, 
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embodies this principle. The imposing façade moves away from the simplicity of the 
Bolshevik formalism, in favor of extravagant conservative design, and vivid 
decorative features. Stalinist architecture would change the landscape of Moscow, 
and much of his work still remains today.48 
 In 1938, the Soviet Union launched another Five Year Plan, to focus on 
production of modern household goods, something that Stalin considered a 
hallmark of a modern industrial country.49 This plan came to an abrupt halt when 
the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union. This would put to test Stalin’s modernization of 
Russia. Would it meet the same humiliating defeat as it had in Crimea under the 
tsars? As we know now, Russia was able to repel the Nazi invaders, despite being 
armed with less modern weapons. 
 Even Russian agriculture required industrialization. In the early 1900s, many 
peasants still used horse-drawn plows instead of tractors, and Stalin decided that in 
order to achieve the food production quotas set in the five year plan, the Soviets 
would have to alter the ways in which their agriculture was organized. In this, he 
needed collectivization, something which many peasants, and kulaks, (the slightly 
richer farming class) were reluctant to do, a problem that led to pre-war famines. 
However, by the time the war began in earnest, Stalin had used his purges and 
secret police to thoroughly eliminate the Kulaks, and force the peasants into his new 
collectivized farms, the Kolkhozes. Here, Stalin would undertake another ambitious 
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project: full literacy of the former peasant class. In the same way as production had 
been, the agricultural sector was upgraded by Stalin’s rapid industrialization, with 
heavy costs to the populace at large.  
 In conclusion, without Stalin’s feverish support of extreme-left positions of 
revitalization and establishment of Russian industry, the Soviet Union would never 
have been able to accelerate it’s military and industrial capabilities to meet the 
demands of World War II. Had such rapid advancement not taken place, it’s likely 
that Russia would still be a backwards country. While industry would have 
eventually taken root, as it does everywhere, those who simply refused to adapt to a 
new market environment would have heavily retarded its peaceful advancement. 
Even one of the founding fathers of the revolution, Leon Trostky, recognized this, 
and the necessary evil that Russia was forced to undertake at the risk of being 
destroyed by foreign powers if they did not.50 Stalin’s harshness against any and all 
opposition forced this industrialization in just under two decades, at the cost of 
millions of lives. However, this cost is not something that she be accepted, and 
Russia still pays the price for the purges. The apartments dotted across Russia did 
allow it to establish itself as a modern country, but these were built by slave labor. 
The factory towns had replaced the farms as Russia’s primary source of economic 
growth, but the workers in these factories were both forbidden to leave and 
compelled to work. Solzhenitsyn, in his book, prophetically warns of the future 
destined for Russia because of the cutting of corners and forcing opposition 
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underground. 
 “In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it 
appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the 
future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are not simply 
protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice 
from beneath new generations.”51 
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Part IV 
 
Gloom 
1945-1991 
 
 
 
 
 
How the unstable economy set up by Stalin could not be saved, 
and how the Soviet Union would focus instead on damage 
control for an inevitable collapse 
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 The Soviet Union has today become a symbol of totalitarianism; even the 
hammer and sickle, designed to be associated with the common worker, has become 
synonymous with a vastly overreaching government, marked by extrajudicial 
disappearances, mass killing, forced starvations, and other such monstrous 
behavior. In a totalitarian state, the government is forced, in order to predict and 
control the economy, to control every action undertaken by its citizens, which leads 
to the eradication of basic human rights, and eventually, a disregard for the value of 
human life in general. The early Soviet Union set the stage with it’s extreme violence 
and intimidation, but the apathy, despondency, and gloom of the later Soviet Union 
led to it’s collapse. 
 After the aggressive policies of Stalinism had given way to the coldly 
bureaucratic policies of the middle Soviet Union, Russian industries faced not a 
collapse, but a decay brought on by the overwhelming feelings of hopelessness 
surrounding the governmental bureaus tasked with managing said industries. These 
feelings would prevail for several decades after the war, during which Russia 
remained an opposite of the US as the only other superpower left in what came to be 
known as the Cold War. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the final secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would eventually bring about a revolution 
in Russia. But this would not be one as before. Gorbachev had learned the lessons of 
Stalinism, and change would be brought about through increased freedom and 
peaceable transition of economic structuring. 
 In examining what led up to the Soviet Union’s collapse, we must begin in post-
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war Soviet Union. After Soviet Spies successfully stole details of the United States’ 
secret weapon, the atomic bomb, they detonated their first prototype in 1949, 
signaling to the world their unequivocal dominance in the East, and beginning the 
nuclear arms race. The Soviet government, having suffered heavy losses in World 
War II, began reaching out to Communist groups around the world, formalizing 
alliances with China and Korea. As the west began operations in the Korean War, 
and the Berlin Blockade took effect, the relations between East and West 
deteriorated almost completely in just two years. In 1953, the United States and 
Soviet Union tested their first thermonuclear bombs.  
 The Soviets also established the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet counter to NATO, 
coming as close to a war scenario with the West as they ever would. However, a new 
force was brewing in Russia: the anti-Stalinist sentiments had come to a head by 
dissidents in the political class who worried Stalin’s impetuousness would bring 
them destruction. Nikita Khrushchev, one such person, gave a speech to the 20th 
Communist party conference in secret, harshly rebuking Stalinism and Stalin himself 
as having a dictatorial rule and only maintaining power through a cult of 
personality. This speech (О культе личности и его последствиях) would herald 
yet another period of optimistic transformation. Khrushchev opposed the purges, 
the consolidation of power, and above all else, the reestablishment by Stalin of a 
caste system. 
 Khrushchev’s support grew quickly, and a new era dawned, marked by the 
Post-Stalin thaw. Khrushchev had a simple peasant background and worked to 
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stabilize relations with the West, and it was his cool head that helped him navigate 
the U-2 crisis more soberly than Stalin likely would have. In 1960, a United States 
spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, something that could not go 
unpunished, and required the Soviet government’s attention. Because the United 
States was now conclusively shown to be spying on the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s 
hand was forced by the international community: inaction would be weakness, and 
the U-2 crisis hurt the relationship by forcing the Soviet government to increase 
military spending and decrease domestic spending. This inadvertently led to the 
second blow to his domestic agenda: because the Soviet Union had redoubled their 
war efforts, the United States was forced to increase theirs as well, and this increase 
in arms led to the Cuban missile crisis just two years later, due to the accelerating 
tide of war. 
 Domestically, Khrushchev dealt with demand for residences by developing the 
Khrushchyovka, a low-cost, concrete-paneled apartment, and typically about five 
stories tall. These were built under Khrushchev across the entire Soviet Union, and 
as they were prefabricated, their production continued right up until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union tried to embrace the industrial age, nothing 
can be so distinctly architecturally representative of this mood as the 
Khrushchyovka; grey, concrete, cheap, prone to insulation failures and plumbing 
failures, and all the same.
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 This simple Khrushchyovka still stands today on the edge of Moscow’s 
business district. The brick-and-mortar style seen here was rare, and was typically 
replaced with simple concrete. The five-story style was necessary because the water 
could not effectively be brought to higher story buildings.  
 Under Khrushchev, the Stalinist political violence and rigid centralization of 
economics would come to an end. His criticisms and calls for reform were not 
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hollow, and his destalinization efforts would be sweeping, economically. The shift 
away from farms was so harshly implemented that it was irreversible, and anyway, 
Khrushchev was of the opinion that the sacrifices made by millions in pursuit of 
rapid industrialization should not be in vain. However he also held agricultural 
production in higher esteem than industrial production.  
 Khrushchev’s establishment of the Sovnarkhoz system, localized central 
economies, made the economy more efficient, and less centralized, and under him, 
grain output would rise from 83 million tons to 136 million tons between the years 
of 1953 and 1958. However, virgin land cultivation and overly optimistic harvest 
schedules meant that these harvests would taper and fail after successive years. As 
the Soviet Union moved into the mid 1960s, party officials would replace 
Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev.  
 Deemed a ‘safe pick’ by most in government, Brezhnev was notoriously 
cautious. This was touted by the Central Committee as one of his greatest assets 
over the at-times brash Khrushchev. In a real-life example of the idiom “be careful 
what you wish for,” this supposed asset would lead the Soviet Union into a period of 
decline. He reversed Khrushchev’s destalinization efforts, and he opposed the 
Sovnarkhozy from the beginning, limiting their authority and attempting to 
recentralize the government around Moscow planning committees. 
 Very little good or bad would happen under Brezhnev, and his plans simply led 
 54 
the Soviet Union into stagnancy.52 Historian John Keep cites growth rate estimates 
between 1965 and 1985 as follows53: 
Growth Rate Estimates between 1965-1985 
 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 
Western  4.9 3.0 1.9 1.8 
Khanin 4.1 3.2 1.0 0.6 
 
 This slow descent into economic stagnation manifested itself as shrinking 
consumption of goods, increased cost of groceries 231, and decreased consumption 
of ‘exotic’ or imported foods. Below is the percentage growth54 in the consumption 
of selected consumer goods, as it appeared in the years immediately following 
Khrushchev, and then after a decade of Brezhnevism. 
Sector 1966-1970 1976-1980 
Food 4.3 1.3 
Soft Goods 7.1 3.1 
Durables 9.1 5.4 
Personal 5.8 3.4 
 
 Lastly, the quality of food in the later Soviet Union would fall as well, most 
particularly in the more remote regions and towns, possibly setting the stage for a 
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migration away to only the largest regional cities after the collapse. Food 
consumption between the years of 1965 and 1985 is as follows, according to John 
Keep, would decline as prices sharply increased, particularly on bread. In 1979, a 
loaf of bread in Moscow was nearly five times more valuable than a loaf of bread in 
London, and seven times more than in Washington.55 
 He made some minor social reforms, such as the establishment of a minimum 
wage and five-day workweek, and the subsidization of food production costs. 
However, the farms were still unproductive, so this pay was pointless, as there was 
no food to actually spend their money on. Despite this, living standards did improve. 
Nearly three quarters of Russians owned a television in 1975, compared with one 
quarter when Brezhnev took power. 
 Brezhnev’s changes to housing were, as many of his other changes, minor. The 
old five-story Khrushchovky were revitalized into ten-story Brezhnevky. These 
were slightly less prone to insulation and plumbing failures, but again represented 
the cold industrialization of the dreary state of the Russian economy. The 
Brezhnevky did, however, allow for increased urban growth. Below are two 
examples of a typical Brezhnevka: mundane and easily constructed, but necessary 
for housing the influx of workers.  
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 These buildings, are, unlike the Stalinist apartments and the Khrushchovky, 
still widely used in Russia today. As so many were built, they are a plentiful resource 
which the modern Russian government utilizes to the fullest extent. 
 As the wonderment of the industrial age wore off and was replaced with a 
more apathetic efficiency, Brezhnevky were exactly the appropriate 
accommodation: cheap, quick to make, and larger than Khrushchovky. In 1960, 
Russian urban population was at about 53.731%, and when Brezhnev stepped down 
after two decades of constructing Brezhnevky around the country, urban population 
had risen steadily to 71.597%.56 Though it was not exactly a comfortable time, it was 
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neither particularly uncomfortable, and Brezhnev’s rule would pave the way for 
Gorbachev, modernization, and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet System 
altogether. 
 Nikita Gorbachev, the next major Soviet leader, facing pressure from the 
international community for Russia’s involvements in Afghanistan, began a period 
of westernization. In May 1985, Gorbachev gave a speech in Leningrad, decrying the 
slow economic growth under Brezhnev, and most notably calling for sweeping 
reforms to the substandard industrial age housing. As the industrial age drew to a 
close, and Brezhnev’s stagnant economy had not propelled Russia nearly as far as 
Stalin’s or Khrushchev’s, Gorbachev now would force another great change to the 
Russian system. The rank-and-file industrialized world governed by a monolithic 
entity and checked by labor unions, which had dominated the political landscape 
across all modern countries, was about to see a paradigm shift as the information 
age dawned. Old rigidity would face necessary deregulation as the age demanded 
economically nimble markets, or be destroyed, and Gorbachev had learned the 
lessons of Stalinism and Brezhnev’s soft apathetic government. 
 Gorbachev would later introduce glasnost, a series of freedoms for the Soviet 
people that allowed for the first time in three generations to see parts of their 
government that had been unturned in decades. The press was given freedom, 
political prisoners returned from exile, freedom of speech was granted, and most 
importantly, two years later, Gorbachev would step down as chairman and retake 
command as president, signaling to the world the end of Stalinist communism in the 
 59 
Soviet Union. 
 Gorbachev’s architectural contributions were again, a simple increase in size, 
both of the buildings, and the individual apartment units. 
 
With modern plumbing came the ability to make taller buildings, and these would 
prove critical in the shifts to the major cities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
These Gorbachev-era apartments would be the final evolution of the simple style of 
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Soviet apartment. 
 Although this can be a touchy subject with many Russians, the fact of the 
matter is that it was precisely the apathy brought on by Brezhnev and the later 
Soviet politics that discounted the mighty Soviet military. Professor John Lewis 
Gaddis of Yale University writes in his book “We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War 
History”.57 
 “The end of the Cold War made it blindingly clear that military strength does 
not always determine the course of great events: the Soviet Union collapsed, after 
all, with its arms and armed forces fully intact. Deficiencies in other kinds of power-
economic, ideological, cultural, moral-caused the USSR to lose its superpower status, 
and we can now see that a slow but steady erosion in those non-military capabilities 
had been going on for some time.” 
 Even with such a massive powerful military, the Soviet Union’s mistreatment 
of it’s own people brought on a feeling of pointlessness. Alcoholism ran rampant as 
people tried to cope with the grinding gloom. Although the government still had the 
people under its thumb, it had lost the hearts and minds of its citizens. They had, 
from an ideological and cultural standpoint, completely lost faith in their leadership. 
The KGB and secret police forces increased dramatically following 1963, and this 
added to the despondency. Many East Germans and other citizens of Soviet satellites 
were shot trying to escape the despair, which only served to increase and validate 
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people’s distrust of the actions perpetrated by the regime. Historian Vladislav Zubok 
also discussed at one point the importance of leadership in the Soviet Union, and the 
fact that near the end of the cold war, the Soviet Union did not have a nationally 
heroic figure in Gorbachev to rally around, as the United States did in Ronald 
Reagan, was a distinct disadvantage. In fact, as Zubok frames it:58 
 The United States was also lucky to have an enemy that represented the 
ideological, economic, and political mirror image of Western capitalism. This enemy 
was the product of the European search for modernity. In other words, the Cold War 
was a competition between very distant cousins, who fought over the best way to 
modernize and globalize the world, not between the friends and foes of 
modernization and globalization.  
 Gorbachev was effective in modernizing the economic and political system in 
Russian through democratization and liberalization, but perhaps most importantly, 
Gorbachev did not allow himself to fall into the trap of becoming corrupted by the 
mass of power he had. In my opinion, had he not had the moral understanding that 
absolute power corrupts absolutely, he would not have sought to limit his own 
powers nor the powers of his government. This anti-autocratic attitude could not 
cohabit with the paradigm of government already in place. Gorbachev deserves 
credit for standing by his beliefs, which are much more moral than the system in 
place before his, and he deserves credit for his attempts to modernize without 
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completely tearing down the society he was governing, as the Bolsheviks did the 
tsar. Many Russians today feel that Gorbachev betrayed them by collapsing the 
system, and was therefore responsible for the ensuing chaos, but this is no more his 
fault than the fault of those former citizens of the Soviet Union who would take 
advantage of the chaos, harming others in the process. 
 When a government has to enforce a system of controlled economics, it 
requires a great degree of intimidation of it’s citizens, a factor that contributes 
greatly to the results of the Cold War. When this archaic and unfair system could no 
longer persist in the modern world, Glastnost and Perestroika came, allowing 
people to see how their government worked (or didn’t.) The dispirited populace 
struggled with rampant alcoholism, which led to less work output, which in turn led 
to mass starvation across the poorer areas of the Soviet Union. 
 Freedom of speech is an integral part of a free society. In the words of Ronald 
Reagan, the sitting American president who famously asked Chairman Gorbachev to 
“tear down the wall” separating East and West Berlin: “Freedom is never more than 
one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in the 
bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the 
same, or one day we will spend our sunset years telling our children, and our 
children’s children what it once was like in the United States, when men were free.”  
 Gorbachev’s resolve in bringing more freedom to the Soviet People, even at the 
expense of the stability of government should be the position of all world leaders. 
Though the later Soviet Union was not marked by the same tyrannical fear that the 
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early Soviet Union had under Stalin, it was a bureaucratic and unfair system 
nonetheless, and one that was doomed to fail from the moment it was implemented. 
Gorbachev had learned the lessons of the past, and if the Soviet Union’s trajectory 
was unavoidable, his sweeping reforms would come by legislation rather than force. 
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Part V 
 
Collapse and Rebirth 
1991-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
How Gorbachev’s deliberate wrecking of the Soviet system 
prevented another revolution, but led to pandemonium across 
a new nation. 
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 The struggles a new nation undergoes when a great political change occurs are 
likely the cause of millions of deaths since the dawn of civilization. Even today, 
developing countries which face coup d’etats can see shockingly high amounts of 
casualties. The Soviet Union had already undergone three great periods of 
transformation before Gorbachev: the extremity of Stalinism, the tolerance of 
Krushchevism, and the apathy of Brezhnevism. During this time, the Russian 
economy evolved from agricultural to industrial in just a few short decades, an 
absolutely herculean effort. However, because Russia joined the industrial 
revolution in earnest so late, it hadn’t the time to build a strong foundation for an 
industrial culture before another great age beckoned: the information age.  
 The fall of communism was precipitated by Gorbachev’s injection of personal 
freedom into the country59, but was more than just a mere political event. 
Economics and politics were fused seemingly inescapably, and this left the Russian 
people with very few ideas of democracy. But Gorbachev’s recognition of both the 
inhumanity of a monolithic non-democratic government and the impracticality of a 
centrally planned economy tasked him with the difficult task of liberalization. As we 
know today, Russia’s transition to a democracy has been fraught with difficulty, but 
how can this be if the principles on which it was founded were fundamentally 
sound? The dilemma that Russia has demonstrated to the world is that trying to 
reconstruct a socialist government in the traditions of capitalism and democracy 
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leads the two coming into conflict with each other.  
 The establishment of democracy in a non-capitalist country often hinders 
capitalist growth because of reactionary apprehension of change60, and programs 
that further capitalist goals often shake the unstable foundations of a new 
democracy. These problems are at the heart of Russia’s difficulties to this day. The 
creation of a democratic nation-state from the skeletal remains of a socialist 
government has led typically younger Russians to clash with typically older 
Russians on whether Gorbachev’s revisions were for the best. But just because 
Gorbachev was a moral man who was not oppressive does not mean the system 
prevented oppressive chairmen. Another Brezhnev or Stalin, who either largely 
ignored or openly oppressed his people would be able to take the reigns, and if so, 
the Russian rebirth would not have been so peaceable, and likely would have ended 
in open revolt, in the same way that the Romanians revolted against the Ceausescus 
in the later 1980s. But this was to a much smaller degree, and the problems facing 
Romania after the revolution were much more concentrated than those of 90s 
Russia. 
 Historian Philippe Schmitter writes in his book “Dangers and Dilemmas of 
Democracy” that there is “no simply democratic way of deciding what a nation and 
its corresponding political unit should be.”61 This is precisely what the Russian 
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Federation attempted to do, and to add to the confusion, nationalist elements in 
multiethnic areas across Russia required force beyond a typical democracy in order 
to preserve the integrity of the nation-state. In regions like Sakhalin and Tatarstan, 
rich national resources and different ethnicities to Moscow have led to chaotic 
negotiations about whether Russia should even continue in it’s current form. 
 Boris Yeltsin, the first Russian president after Gorbachev, was faced with these 
challenges, and his presidential term encapsulates the rough time period in which 
Russia was in flux, and is called in Russia today the crazy 90s. Yeltsin showed in 
February 1994 that he was willing to compromise in the name of defusing potential 
revolutions. Staving these off required his signing of a treaty with Tatarstan, 
granting it rights to it’s own international relations and providing it with 
considerable autonomy. This treaty showed the absolute limit to the concessions 
that Yeltsin was willing to make in pursuit of preservation.  
 At the same time however, Yeltsin was beginning the First Chechen War. When 
Chechen separatists attempted to break away from Russia, Yeltsin crushed the 
dissenters brutally, killing over 80,000 Chechen civilians. Though he was willing in 
cases like Tatarstan to make concessions, he also demonstrated a total 
unwillingness to allow his country to fall apart, and was willing to assume an 
authoritarian role to suppress the rebellion. 
 However we cannot blame Yeltsin entirely for the problems. Though he may 
have exacerbated them, he was not the cause. The collapse of the Soviet system was 
a crucial turning point for both the Russian culture and the world in general. All the 
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political developments that had hinged on the assumption that the Soviet Union 
would be a continuing success were now questioned, shaking the foundations of 
several nations. Karl Marx, the philosopher behind the ideals of Soviet communism, 
had assured people in his book the Communist Manifesto that “The history of all 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle_”62 These struggles were, 
according to Marx, to lead a great revolution in which national identities would be 
foregone as classes united against one another. The proletariat across the world 
would rise against the bourgeoisie and that this was the ultimate fate of humanity.  
 The fall would certainly demonstrate some flaw with the theory. The Soviet 
Union had moved along the correct trajectory following Marxist theory closely but 
still failed. To understand what happened, we must therefore examine the very 
roots of communist theory, as it was implemented by the Soviets. 
 Stalinism is arguably where they first deviated, but pursuit of the ideals of 
Marxism continued until sometime between Brezhnev’s rule and Gorbachev’s. In the 
later Soviet model, under Brezhnev, transactional decisions were not to be made but 
by the educated members of the Soviet. These highly educated professionals had 
much more authority than the leaders in the west. If we were to assume that this 
system was governed by the ten smartest people in the world, as a hyperbolic 
example, two things about this system must be realized: first of all, the members of 
the Soviet government didn’t always agree. This should tell you something right 
away about the nature of philosophy. Second, there are always several areas in 
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which the average able-minded adult knows more than all ten of the smartest 
people on planet earth. It could be something as innocuous as the details of the life 
of Alexander the Great, or it could be the correct temperature at which to store fresh 
eggs, or how to properly string a tennis racket. There will always be many things 
where common citizens know more than those in charge of them. The American and 
Russian economies, around 1900, were radically different in terms of size and 
organization, but the basic idea is the same in any society: every day, many 
individual transactions all across the land take place, in a nation of 250 million 
people (the population of 1970 Soviet Union.) This amounts to likely billions of 
transactions every singly day, far too many to be calculated by a smart group of elite, 
particularly when the issue could be outsourced to a specialist. For example, who 
better to run a farm in Krasnoyarsk than a farmer from Krasnoyarsk? 
 Although this government team is composed of geniuses, how could they know 
how much he pays for his tools, what percentage of his savings go toward expansion 
of his little farm, how much he has put away in case of disaster, and all of these 
factors that make up that man’s individual decision to sell his crops at a certain 
price. Then, the economics become even more complex as one realizes that all these 
transactions are interconnected. That the commissar in town who set the price of 
his crop determined, by extension, the amount that another could spend that year 
on a new harvesting tool, and that determined whether the blacksmith could hire a 
new apprentice. 
 No ten people are smart enough to track this data, let alone interpret it or even 
 70 
plan for the future. The level of intelligence of those ten people is likely more than a 
million times less than what is needed to run an economy. The only way that an elite 
bureau of intelligent economists in Moscow could plan such a monumental 
undertaking as a national economy is to control it, and every aspect of it, which 
leads to such despondency and gloom that we saw near the end of the Soviet Union, 
when the pervasive feeling of hopelessness was inescapable. 
 Development slows to a halt to fit through this intelligence bottleneck, drop by 
drop, until eventually the pressure grows to such a point, that the whole system 
collapses. The interactions of life were interpreted by the Soviet system as a series 
of billiard balls on a frictionless table, where all the crashes and collisions can be 
predicted into infinity. Human nature is unpredictable and unreasonable. Any 
economic equation with human interaction in it is chaos. The variables involved in 
any equation concerning the 250 million people in the Russian economy of 1900 can 
be represented by chaos to the power of 250 million. The only way to have even the 
mildest degree of control over this amount of people is to have these 250 million 
individuals, each make personal decisions on their own issues, and the ones closest 
to them. Ten individuals, several thousand miles away are woefully ill prepared, 
even if they are twice or three times as smart as the average civilian. These truths 
are self-evident, and have been repeated under the guise of various ideologies 
throughout history, but all are doomed to failure, and the propensity to form golden 
ages under this system are bleak at best. 
 Communism had spread like a cult to Albania, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
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Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, North Korea, Somalia, Cambodia, and 
Yemen. By promising a state of the people by the people and for the people, it 
appeared to be a godsend to many oppressed working-class people across the 
world. And all followed the Soviet’s example of rapid industrialization to escape the 
agricultural lifestyles they perceive were holding them back. The ultimate goal was 
to create an international utopia. Communist countries turned to the USSR in the 
same way that newly capitalist countries turned to the US, and without the massive 
trading partner they had in the USSR, the communist parties of these countries 
dwindled and died. 
 When you give people a taste of freedom, it is very difficult to encumber them 
with chains again. Through Glasnost and Perestroika, Gorbachev doomed any 
potential for communism to continue in Russia, at least in the Soviet style. When 
Neo-Stalinists staged a coup and attempted to remove Gorbachev from power and 
replace him with someone more in line with Stalinist thinking: someone to rule with 
an iron fist and drag Russia into the future, they were met with heavy resistance. It 
was not, as they would come to learn, purely Gorbachev pulling Russia away from 
Marxism: the elites in Moscow saw the prosperity of the west and envied it, losing 
faith in their system. 
 Yeltsin’s attempts to shock the Russian economy back to life were obviously 
detrimental in hindsight, as they had several unintended consequences and didn’t 
even succeed in reinvigorating the economy, but he cannot be blamed for this. He 
was tasked with liberalization, democratization, and stabilization all at once, which 
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is not surmountable in two mere presidential terms.  
 His liberalization efforts only increased the inflation. The quick establishment 
of capitalism meant that the most enterprising (and with no checks and regulations, 
often the most ruthless) rose to the top in crypto-syndicates across Russia. His 
stabilization efforts could be described as austerity measures, punishing waste and 
inefficiency. But this did not reduce inefficiency; it merely hid it from sight, driving 
Russia into a depression.   
 Remaking both it’s political and economic structures at once was, as before, a 
massive obstacle, but now, in the 21st century, the crimes Stalin committed against 
his own people in his rapid rebuilding of Russia were not tolerated, particularly in a 
modern country like Russia. The new Russia also needed to contend with holdover 
massive military spending from the Soviet Union, and their difficulties transitioning 
into democracy were manifest from the beginning of the 1990s, and Russia would 
remain in a depression until 1999. 
 During this depression, while the new Russian government  was contending 
with these problems, the public support systems dropped, and people were 
essentially left to fend for themselves. Migration to the cities stopped completely63 
as movement was no longer an affordable option, and poverty rates skyrocketed to 
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50%.64 
 One positive effect was the architectural revolution that Yeltsin’s liberalizing 
policies led to. Under him, the architecturally drab apartments of the past were cast 
out as a new culture of western individualism took root. During the early and mid-
nineties, a few major companies managed to eke out an oligopoly on construction 
firms. 
 These apartments look much more familiar to us, as they are again influenced 
by western architectural styles, and private architecture firms such as Glavstroy, 
LSR, Mitz, and Perviy Stroitel’niy Trest have filled the void left by the collapse of 
Soviet central planning. Balconies, more intricate facades, and even columns are 
featured, and the size is limited only by modern plumbing and heating standards.  
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 Yeltsin’s efforts to privatize the economy by trading vouchers for cash were 
abused, and dangerous elements began heading gangs to collect these vouchers, 
often through criminal enterprises. These individuals became fabulously wealthy 
much faster than they possibly could have overseas. These elites began taking 
positions of power, controlling the Russian financial and industrial sectors, known 
today as the Russian Oligarchs.  
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 It was a tragic irony that Russia, in pursuit of justice found unimaginable 
injustice, as the oligarchs ran rampant, and in pursuit of prosperity found 
unimaginable poverty, as people across the country starved.  
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Part VI 
 
 
1999-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
How Russia has coped with the many problems it faced in the 
collapse and adapted to the information age. 
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 Russia’s economy today has faced considerable difficulties transitioning to the 
demands of the information age. An economically nimble economy is predicated on 
the adaptability and entrepreneurial spirit of the people, and Russia had been 
unable to foster an atmosphere of eagerness. Russia’s GDP growth has been 
sporadic at best. To understand where the citizens of Russia find themselves today, 
we must analyze first the national crises the country has found itself in since its 
inception. 
 
 
 This economic instability that came just after the recession in the 1990s has 
led to a very cautious populace. Growth is, unlike most other western countries, not 
guaranteed each year. Falling oil prices, economic sanctions imposed by the west, 
and a weak national market have all contributed to the ongoing downturn.  Russia 
faces a multitude of both external and internal challenges. As an energy producer, 
particularly natural gas, Russia has had to contend with falling gas prices and a 
shrinking trade market. Russia has also, as a method of saber rattling against the 
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United States’ sanctions, begun bulking up it’s military. Defense spending has 
reached a ten-year high, soaking up money that could otherwise be used for social 
programs.  
 The reasons for Russia undertaking military modernization can be understood 
as typical of current president Vladimir Putin. A cynic may look at Putin’s rise to 
power as having taken full advantage of the chaos of the 90s. While these criticisms 
may contain a grain of truth, the full story is more nuanced. Putin’s story begins in 
Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. As young KGB officer, Putin was trained from an early age 
in the ways of espionage and foreign relations. From 1985 to 1990, he worked as a 
KGB agent in East Germany, and after this he was transferred to become assistant 
rector of Leningrad State University for international affairs. After the collapse, 
Putin became chairman of the St. Petersburg City Hall’s committee for foreign 
relations, from where he would rise through the ranks to become Prime Minister 
under Yeltsin. When Yeltsin stepped down in 1999, Putin was named as his 
replacement, and the rest is history.  
 In all this time, Putin’s focus has been on Russia’s standing in the international 
community, and his specialty, as a statesman, has been negotiation and the 
manipulation of world affairs. He has done very little for the Russian people directly, 
and this has created a shaky economy, and one in which the success of the Russian 
people is directly correlated with the success of Russia internationally. Though 
Russia does not have more than peacekeeping troops in Syria, nor does it have any 
significant garrisons in Crimea, (nor any in Ukraine, despite the popular 
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misconceptions,) it’s full withdrawal has not been accepted by mainstream 
European politicians, and likely never will be as ongoing political gambits drive east 
and west to clash. 
 Russia is also facing stiff competition from the US in supplying natural gas to 
Europe. Russia, still operating in an industrialist mindset, has not adapted to the 
information age economy as the US has, which is why it’s natural resource 
extraction facilities and energy services find themselves in increasingly dire straits. 
What this has meant for average Russians is a heavily discouraged economic libido, 
and much ambiguity about the future and the stability of their jobs. Furthering 
vulnerability, an income collapse since the imposition of sanctions has forced many 
Russians to take matters into their own hands65, fleeing former Soviet resource 
extracting towns to central cities across Russia. 
 We can observe this phenomenon through two population graphs. First, the 
population of Russia that lives in rural versus urban environments. Second, the 
population of Moscow over the course of the Soviet collapse, birth of the Russian 
federation, imposition of sanctions, and into the future.  
 Because Russia has attempted to maintain an agrarian industry into the 
modern era66, the amount of rural emigrants has dramatically decreased, and 
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tapered off to become constant.
 
 This chart (from WorldBank) illustrates the percentage of Russians who live in 
rural communities. In 1990, it’s about 26.6% and today, it’s 25.9%. After the 
disintegration of public works facilities and public services, most people who lived 
in villages and on farms were trapped by their own jobs, unable to flee to the cities. 
This illustrates half of the theory; that those who lived in distinctly rural areas were 
no longer moving to towns or cities. But the other half of the theory comes directly 
from the Russian Ministry of Statistics: 
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 This shows that the population of Moscow has not only grown since 1990, but 
actually grown at increasing rate. Those with the ability to make the move from 
nearby resource towns such as Chekhov, did. It is not the farms that are being 
abandoned across the nation, but the villages and towns. RT estimates that in 2010, 
3,000 villages across Russia became completely deserted, and with these young 
Russians go the workforce. Schools, hospitals, and entire industries are shutting 
down, as they neither have anyone to work for, nor do they have anyone seeking a 
job.  
 The graphs charting the populations of smaller industry towns in Russia nearly 
without exception look like the inverse of this Moscow chart, while the major cities 
(St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Rostov, and Samara) 
all have similarly grown since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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 The shift is inescapable, and the Russian government is critically aware of the 
problems facing their rural regions. Putin has made several attempts to combat this 
rural flight, most notably his homesteading efforts. RT reports in January, 2015: 
“The Russian president has approved the idea to offer large land plots for free to 
anyone who resettles to the Russian Far East to start a farm or other business.”  
 This effort was allegedly to strengthen the tendency of people’s migration to 
the Far East, and included regions rich in game, tinder, gold, coal, farmland, and 
many other natural resources, but this has been met with little success, as Russia 
has been forced to contend with an unfortunate reality of the information age: an 
abandonment of small, individual farms because of profitability. Major corporations 
can, using heavy farm equipment, complete the jobs of an individual farming family 
for cheaper, faster, and with less manpower.67 Thus ended Putin’s short-lived 
homesteading efforts, to be replaced with something more lucrative. Today, the 
Russian government has made attempts to spread to the far East by subsidizing the 
businesses of the primary regional cities, signaling to the world that they have 
abandoned attempts to revitalize the rural population and are now focusing instead 
on simply moving people to the Far East at all.  
 Those left in the rural communities, particularly those in the Far East and 
Extreme North sectors of Russia are quite literally left out in the cold. Historian 
Martin McCauley views the agricultural crisis as being compounded by the declining 
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population of Russia, and the disinterest of young Russians in farming. “The New 
Russians have no interest in agriculture, but they are extremely keen to acquire a 
dacha. A New Russian without a dacha is like a dog without a bone. Practically every 
Muscovite aspires to a private plot and dacha.”68 As the Soviet infrastructure 
crumbles little by little each year, and more and more people flee the old resource-
extracting towns, this is a pressing issue that Russia must contend with. The lives of 
its citizens are on the line.  
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Part VII 
 
What’s Next? 
2017-Future 
 
 
 
 
A summary and speculation about the future of Russia, as she 
reluctantly moves into the information age. 
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 Russian history has all too often been dismal, and even researching it can prove to 
be a depressing endeavor. From the beginning, it has been tale after tale of tragedy, and 
even in the snippet of modernity that I have chosen to research, cruelty beyond human 
comprehension was committed, and to such a magnitude that it no longer even feels like 
anything more than a statistic. The wellbeing of the Russian people has often taken a 
backseat to other, seemingly larger problems, and often, they have been relegated to 
living conditions that a middle-class western family might find appalling. 
 Russia, from its roots as one of the last major agricultural powers, was dotted with 
villages. Around 80% of the people lived in farming cottages, in the same way as 
generations of Russians had before them. There was little education, little improvement, 
and modern amenities such as running water and refrigeration were scant.  
 The opulence and unwillingness to adapt of Nicholas II was the gasket that 
eventually blew, forcing Russia into the industrial age. Though the troubles the Russian 
people would face ahead were enormous, it was through the harshness of Stalinism that 
an entire national mindset could be transformed in just a generation from that of 
agricultural to that of industrial. The cost, however, is something that can never be 
forgotten.  
 During and after the revolution, the Soviet shift to the industrial age triggered an 
awareness of the backwardness of the Russian living style. The capacious apartments of 
the aristocrats were immediately converted into communal apartments to accommodate 
those first workers whom the Soviet government moved for the purposes of laboring in 
the factory towns across the country. But once the former palaces were filled, and the 
factories were still not running to full capacity, the government was forced to conceive of 
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the first prefabricated Russian housing. The Kommunalki, little more than dormitories, 
began appearing across Russia. 
 Through the purges, Stalin was able to instill such a fear or, at least, a numbness in 
his citizens, that they, fearing that they would end up buried in the permafrost like the 
rest, simply lost the will to fight, and complied with Stalin’s plan for economic growth. 
Some peasants, still loyal to their newfound freedom, were unwilling to transfer 
ownership of what little material possessions they had to Soviet government, instead 
choosing to destroy them. Similarly, the Soviet government demanded that people give 
up their religious beliefs, in accordance with Marx’s theory that it was the opiate of the 
masses. However, this only drove religion underground, which had the opposite effect the 
Soviets had wanted: instead of controlling the minds of it’s populace, it only further 
distanced them from their citizens. Marxist theory dictated that these people would 
simply adapt to having communal kitchens and communal bathrooms, but it seemed to 
many that this was not the case.  
 After Stalin’s death, the Kommunalki program was halted and replaced with the 
Khrushchevki, more modern, more personal apartments allowing for more living space, 
and came equipped with personal bathrooms and kitchens, rather than communal. Then 
came Brezhnevki, larger versions allowing still greater personal freedom.  
 In the United States, freedom of choice has brought the government closer to it’s 
people, something that Khrushchev and Brezhnev may have benefitted from, whether 
they are aware of it or not, through their allowances of personal freedom. The philosophy 
is plainly displayed in our constitution to this day: it’s not a matter of how many laws 
must be put on people, but how few can be that the society will continue. This idea is 
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why the United States has never, as the quote so colorfully described, resorted to 
rapacious tactics. The purges are a demonstration of how the Soviet system believed it 
could force human nature into changing, and reshaping its people into the “new Soviet 
person” who would share everything, once all the obstructionists, and wreckers were 
eliminated. Looking back, it can be easy to say that of course this idea is so troublesome, 
because it is based not on how humans really behave, but how we might wish them to 
behave. That one with absolute power might be “good enough” not to be corrupted by it.  
 Anyone who is willing to accept the mantle of absolute power, is by the very nature 
of this act, unworthy of it. As the American Revolutionary War drew to a close, many of 
Washington’s soldiers selected him to be their king, and if he had decided to accept this 
role, I have no doubt that American history would have been much shorter, and much 
bloodier, but his moral fiber prevented him from accepting it, instead insisting that he 
was no more and no less important than every member of the society, and no one should 
force their will upon another. This is why force has never had to be used, or at least, very 
sparingly used, in the United States to such an extent as the purges under Stalin. 
 As the Soviet government collapsed under it’s own ideological weight, the Russian 
government replaced it. Fresh wounds from the hasty transition to industrial age were 
about to be reopened as the information age took over, and with this would come another 
shift in the population. Today, nearly all Russians own an apartment rather than a house, 
because the Soviets had built so much prefabricated housing and planning around this 
style of housing that it was simply not feasible to attempt anything else. In the US, many 
Americans live in urban sprawl, and the American Dream can be represented for many 
coming to our country as a picket fence around a yard and a house in the suburbia of one 
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of our cities, while in Russia, this dream does not exist. Formerly government 
prefabricated housing has been replaced by free market prefabricated housing, and 
though they be equipped with the amenities of modern life, the skeletal structure of the 
houses is exactly the same as it has been since the beginning of the Soviet system.  
 If Russia is to truly take hold of its destiny it must come to realize that the 
agricultural and industrial ways of the past are not areas in which profit is to be found. 
Becoming an economy of services rather than mineral extraction is the only way that 
Russia can hope to both stem the tide of people overcrowding it’s cities, and allow the 
people who have been forgotten and abandoned in the villages the same dignity and 
modern lifestyles as those in its cities.  
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